













Why does Hegel change “Dreaming Soul” to “Feeling Soul” in the 1830 edition of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit? By tracing the content of the Dreaming Soul section, through Hegel’s 1794 manuscript on psychology, to sources such as C.P. Moritz’s Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde, the paper shows how the section embraces a late Enlightenment mission:  combating supposedly supernatural expressions of spiritual enthrallment by explaining them as pathological conditions of the soul. Responding to perceived attacks on the 1827 edition of the Encyclopedia by Schleiermacher, Hegel alters the section and its heading, thereby including the pastor’s religion of feeling in the pathology of Schwärmerei.

	Between the second, 1827 edition of his Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences and the ultimate 1830 edition, Hegel made a number of what might be considered minor changes, particularly in comparison with the extensive revisions undertaken between the first, 1817 edition and the second, “mature, if penultimate formulation”, as Robert Williams writes.​[1]​  One change that does occur between 1827 and 1830 takes place in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (PSS)​[2]​, where Hegel changes the section heading at §403 from “The Dreaming Soul (Die traümende Seele)” to “The Feeling Soul (Die fühlende Seele).” This paper explores the significance of this revision, which, although apparently minor, is hardly superficial.  In fact, by calling attention to the original title, the change from “dreaming” to “feeling” invites us to investigate the origins of Hegel’s thought on this crucial section, whose insights into the particularities of the human soul remain largely unchanged, in spite of the heading change.  The first object of investigation will therefore be the sources of the dreaming soul.  Discovering these origins will then enable to me to propose an answer to why Hegel later changes “dreaming” to “feeling”.
	The section under discussion falls within Hegel’s presentation of the soul (Seele), in the chapter entitled Anthropology. The soul, in the 1830 edition, is presented in three main articulations: a) the natural soul (§§391 - 402); b) the feeling soul (§§403 – 410); the actual soul (§§411 – 412).  Out of the actual soul arises rational consciousness, through a skeletal re-enactment of Hegel’s famous Phenomenology of Mind, perhaps a better translation than “spirit” for Geist, in this subjective context (§§413 – 439). The outcome of the PSS, in Psychology, is rational consciousness articulating itself in theoretical intelligence (Verstand) and practical will, both of which are shown to be ultimately grounded in freedom.  The 1830 “feeling soul” section begins with a short introduction (§§403 – 404) before being divided into three subsections:  (i) the feeling soul in its immediacy (§§405 – 406); (ii) self-feeling (§§407 – 408) and habit (§§409-410), which will not be discussed here. 
Although the actual content of §§ 403 to 408 remains largely unaltered between the second and third editions, along with the change of heading from dreaming to feeling soul, Hegel does make several discrete additions or substitutions that serve to further accentuate the new emphasis on feeling.  Notably, the term “feeling” (fühlen and its derivatives) is substituted for the earlier “sentient” (empfinden and its derivatives) in the main texts of §§ 403 - 406.  In the same sense, the sub-heading for § 405 is changed from “The Passive Totality of the Individual” (1827) to “The Soul that feels in its immediacy” (1830), and its remark is lengthened to include new reflections on feeling.  
	To understand where the dreaming soul comes from, it is necessary to return to a far earlier Hegel text, his 1794 manuscript on psychology (MS), to which Hoffmeister gave the appropriate title of “Materien [building blocks] zu einer Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes”.​[3]​  Although the possible relation between the early manuscript on psychology and the mature editions of the PSS is noted by Petry, in his 1978 translation of the work,​[4]​ substantial investigation into the MS as a source of Hegel’s later work has remained neglected.  Perhaps this is because of the non-discursive, fragmentary nature of the untranslated manuscript, the fact it is largely written in point-form, with many abbreviations.  It is nonetheless remarkable that much of the content of the dreaming or feeling soul section of the mature PSS appears to reprise the contents of a text penned by Hegel thirty-six years before subjective spirit’s ultimate expression.  What is even more remarkable is that the seminal text was actually composed by someone other than Hegel. I will return to the crucial question of provenance later.  For now, let us look briefly at the content of the 1794 MS and compare it with the later editions of the PSS.  This will not only establish the early manuscript as a source, it will also shed light on the origins of the dreaming soul, and help us understand why it is replaced by feeling in the 1830 edition of the Encyclopedia.
	Although the 1794 MS is pregnant with references to psychological theoreticians of the time, such as Abel, Schmidt, Jakob and Garve, identified by Hoffmeister’s impressive scholarship in his Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung, the MS appears, above all, born under the sign of Kant’s transcendental esthetic, through his interpreters  J. Schultze and Karl Reinhold. The latter’s contribution explains why the first part of the MS deals with the mind as productive of representations (Vorstellungen), either as representations of sentience (Empfindungsvorstellungen), derived from the five outer senses or as representations from the inner life of the human organism. The latter enable us to feel inner changes, inner states, to have “self-feeling (Gefühl unsrer Selbst – line 141 in Hoffmeister)” and include “representations from the soul, not worked on by consciousness”.  The “fundamental power of the soul [Seele]” ​[5]​ to generate unbidden, raw representations is the question that occupies the entire middle section of the manuscript, from about lines 150 to 540 in Hoffmeister’s edition, whereupon the section on the understanding  (Verstand) and its concepts puts an abrupt end to the soul’s representations of Phantasie​[6]​.  The MS’s central project concerns how to rationally explain the unconscious resurgence (Wiedererweckung) of forgotten, outer-produced representations and of unbidden inner representations. While the understanding will actively recall inner, conserved representations through remembrance (Erinnerung), this does not explain the resurgence of representations “ohne Erinnerung”, as experienced, for example, by the sleepwalker or the cataleptic.​[7]​ 
	The underlying goal of the central part of the 1794 MS, the part that pertains to the question raised in this paper, is consequently an attempt to impose reason on the unreasonable, to assign rational causes to the irrational manifestations of the soul.  If we can establish what brings about spontaneous representations of the imagination or Phantasie, we may control them. The MS presents a number of possible laws and causes for the unbidden resurgence of representations (lines 217 – 300 Hoffmeister)​[8]​.  The explanations include deformation of the brain, physical illness (hypochondria), fever, passion, light and darkness, weather and drunkenness.  The general cause favored by MS, however, is a weakening of conscious memory (Gedächnis), brought on by illness (lines 280 – 293 Hoffmeister)​[9]​.  In sickness, weakened consciousness is “overpowered” by the soul and its “arbitrary” representations, now forming delusional trains of thought according to Phantasie’s own “laws of association”.​[10]​ 
Those familiar with the articulations of the PSS will have already recognized common elements in the 1794 MS.  The characterization of the soul as self-feeling is echoed in the content and heading of PSS § 407 (Selbstgefühl). The idea of the soul as an unstable store of preserved inner and outer-generated images prefigures the “indeterminate pit (Schacht)” that forms the soul of each individual, in PSS § 403, and which is the source of dreams, illusions and madness.  Above all, the conflictual nature of the relation between conscious mind and the “laws of Phantasie” (line 286 Hoffmeister)​[11]​, where any weakening on the part of the former allows dominance by the latter, is clearly echoed in the 1830 edition of PSS § 405, where Hegel presents the pathological state of Gemüt as arising from an unnatural predominance of the soul over rational subjectivity.​[12]​  As well, in the 1794 MS, the soul already displays a recalcitrant, stubborn nature, a tendency to fixate on ideas and resist change, only accepting “the new” through “unpleasant exercise [and] habit” (line 173 Hoffmeister)​[13]​, an idea the PSS introduces in § 409.​[14]​ On a broader scale, one might also argue that the 1794 MS’s stark juxtaposition between the dream-like imaginings of the unconscious soul and the immediately subsequent section on conscious understanding is later developed into the dialectical transition between anthropology and psychology that Hegel presents in the PSS’s Phenomenology section. 
This is not the place to examine all the differences between the 1794 MS and the mature versions of the PSS as a whole, for example, the fact the MS puts representation in the context of anthropology, rather than presenting it, along with intuition, as a function of conscious mind or that the MS goes on to evoke such apparently extraneous Kantian elements as reflective esthetic judgments and cosmology. Nor is there space to discuss further parallels in content, for example, the MS’s references to Phantasie as productive of literary discourse (Dichtungskraft) and the understanding’s capacity to produce linguistic signs, discussions taken up in the PSS § 458.​[15]​ Now, I want to focus on the section within the MS that concerns me most, where Hegel most clearly finds the building blocks (Materien) for his later discussion of the dreaming soul, which will become the feeling soul, in 1830. 
The section that I am particularly interested in runs from lines 363 to 538 in Hoffmeister’s Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung​[16]​ and immediately follows the lines that I have just been discussing, on the reasons and laws governing the spontaneous resurgence of the soul’s representations. The section is entitled, “Use on certain conditions where Phantasie takes part: Dreams, Somnambulism, madness (Verrückung)​[17]​ premonitions, visions”.  In fact, the text actually begins with a subsection entitled “Sleep”, includes references to clairvoyance as well as to premonition and ends with a final sub-titled section on religious fervor (Schwärmerei) and enthrallment (Enthusiasmus).  The content found in this well-defined section of the 1794 MS is all covered in the PSS’s Dreaming/feeling Soul sub-chapter, in §§ 403 to 408, and particularly in §§ 405 and 406.​[18]​ This correspondence is, of course, more obvious in the 1827 edition, where Hegel still refers to dreaming, which is, as mentioned above, an actual heading in the 1794 MS.  Furthermore, at the end of § 390 of the 1827 edition, Hegel still refers to the following section (from §§ 391 to 402) as dealing with “the sleeping soul”, a reference that is dropped in favor of “the natural soul”, in the 1830 edition.  In other words, the 1827 edition clearly displays the mature PSS’s  (both editions’) debt to the 1794 MS, in which the sleeping soul is presented as a condition where Phantasie has free play, bringing forth both clear and obscure representations that are easily confused with ones derived from the senses. The sleeping soul of the MS is one that hears and sees things that are not there. It dreams, walks in its sleep, which may be “magnetic” (line 434 Hoffmeister)​[19]​; it may become melancholy, mad or deranged, have premonitions or visions and may even fall into the worst excesses of religious fervor. Significantly, these “Zustände (conditions)” are pathological, not because sleeping and dreaming are, in themselves, symptomatic of illness, but because they represent a state where conscious “power over the imagination” (Macht über die Einbildungskraft)​[20]​ is lost.  It is the pathological divagations of the dreaming soul that come to an abrupt halt, when it is snapped awake at the end of this passage, by the stark, unyielding title of the following MS section: Verstand.  Similarly, in PSS’s §§ 403 to 408, the dreaming/feeling soul is one whose “determinations are not developed in conscious content arising from the understanding”.​[21]​  In fact, as Hegel puts it in the § 404 remark, we are clearly dealing with a pathological “condition [Zustand] where the development of the soul, having already arrived at [ …] consciousness and understanding may once again relapse.”​[22]​  The mature PSS’s presentation of dreaming, somnambulism, folly, premonitions, visions and religious fervor as pathological states appears to be derived from the “building blocks” of the 1794 MS. The 1827 edition’s references to the sleeping and dreaming soul make this particularly evident.  However, another, more peculiar shared reference establishes the MS’s paternity, beyond any doubt. 
In the 1794 MS, at the beginning of the section on sleep, there appears the single word, or rather name “Haller”, followed by the words, “incapacity to move freely”.​[23]​  I suspected the text referred to the famous 18th Century physician Albrecht von Haller but could not grasp the reference nor see what it had to do with the topic treated:  how our imagined representations may actually be clearer, more distinct than our empirical ones.  In fact, the name Haller appears again in the 1827-8 lecture notes, recently translated by Robert Williams, however not in the principal Erdmann manuscript but in the Walter notes from the same lectures, which Williams helpfully adds in footnotes. The Walter notes add an even more enigmatic reference, writing, “Haller and the glass leg.”​[24]​  The lengthy Boumann Zusatz to PSS § 408 also refers to “someone who imagined he had glass feet [being] cured by the staging of a pretended robbery”.​[25]​ Googling “Haller and glass feet or legs” will give you some very strange results, but it will not give you the solution to the enigma, which is found in Petry’s translation of the PSS, specifically in the lecture notes taken by Griesheim and Kehler, in the subjective spirit lectures of 1825.​[26]​ Here, we discover that Dr. Haller in Göttingen (therefore indeed Albrecht von Haller) cured a patient who believed he was incapable of movement because he believed he had glass legs, by having some of Haller’s students attack him and his patient while the two were riding in a carriage. Haller ran off; the patient did likewise and was thus cured.  Incidentally, the fact that the Erdmann manuscript chooses not to include what may simply be taken as a colorful anecdote occults the fact that much of the content of the PSS Anthropology Zusätze is inspired by writings in what was known at the time as empirical psychology. I will return to this a little later.  For now, it is enough to have proven that Hegel used the 1794 manuscript on psychology more than thirty years after transcribing it, in his lectures accompanying the Encyclopedia, at least as late as 1827.
Other discrete references in the 1794 MS can be found in the PSS.  However, once again, this is not the place to embark on a detailed analysis of the specific content of the MS in order to elucidate the corresponding content of the PSS.  Besides influencing Hegel in his determination of the above-mentioned dream states as pathological conditions, it is the general context of the MS that reveals an essential aspect of the mature PSS, one that will finally explain the move from “dreaming” to “feeling” soul. This aspect is discovered in the fact that both the MS and the PSS consider the same mental pathologies as arising from a power struggle between rational understanding and the imagination, where the former loses its mastery and is overcome.  The pertinence of this struggle, however, only becomes clear if we return to a question left in suspense above, i.e. the question of provenance. Where does the 1794 MS come from and what do its origins signify?  This is important because the origins of the MS are ultimately those of important parts of the PSS.
 The editors of the critical Gesammelte Werke, having analyzed the MS’s handwriting and the paper’s watermark, conclude it was penned while Hegel was in Bern, probably in 1794.​[27]​  However, Hoffmeister had already speculated that the actual content of the MS was derived from a course Hegel had taken while at Tübingen, from someone in the “Abel’schen Kreis”.​[28]​ Referring to the testimonial of Hegel’s fellow student Betzendörfer, Hoffmeister supposes the source of the MS to have been the Tübingen professor J. F. Flatt, whose course in empirical psychology Hegel followed, in 1789/90.​[29]​  The MS on psychology therefore seems to be the later transcription of course notes that Hegel took while attending Flatt’s lecture four or five years earlier. This supposition seems confirmed by Dieter Henrich, who in 1964 discovered the course notes of Friedrich Klüpfel, another fellow Tübingen student of Hegel’s who also took Flatt’s course in 1790.​[30]​ The content of the Klüpfel course notes is virtually identical to most of the 1794 psychology MS, including that portion of the manuscript under discussion here that deals with the pathological imaginings of the sleeping and dreaming soul and which informs, I have shown, the mature PSS.  This means that much of the inspiration for PSS §§ 403 to 408, on the dreaming/feeling soul, actually comes from J. F. Flatt.​[31]​
	Such a conclusion may be unsettling and even distasteful to those who see Flatt as the “Scrooge of Tübingen”, as Frederick Beiser calls him in his Fate of Reason.​[32]​ Flatt is best known as the assistant of the dogmatic theology professor G. C. Storr, famous for his anachronistic and quixotic defense of orthodox religion and the literal truth (i.e. Revelation) of the Bible, the Trinity and miracles, in the face of the Kantian critiques. Surely, both Flatt and Storr are included in the disparaging remarks Hegel and Schelling share in their correspondence of late 1794 and early 1795, on the poor state of theology at Tübingen. However, as Beiser himself points out, there are, in fact, two Flatts, the “reactionary” professor of theology, defender of supernaturalism​[33]​ and the earlier version, a champion of Leibnizian/Wolffian late Enlightenment reason, against Kant’s critique of metaphysical thought. In his famous polemical reviews of Kant’s work (1788 and 1789)​[34]​, Flatt is arguing for the objective reality of transcendent causation and the consequent possibility for a cosmological proof of the existence of God. In other words, Flatt defends the Enlightenment reason of Leibniz, Wolff and Mendelssohn against the limitations imposed by Kant’s first critique.  It is this J. F. Flatt who put together the lecture notes on empirical psychology. My contention is consequently that the PSS section on the dreaming/feeling soul, which Hegel derives from Flatt’s 1790 lecture, is thoroughly informed by Flatt’s Enlightenment project, the defense of reason against its perceived opposite:  the excessive claims of Phantasie, including somnambulism, premonitions, clairvoyance and religious fervor (Schwärmerei, as a form of mental illness).
	The PSS section on the dreaming/feeling soul is a particularly clear expression of this Enlightenment project championed by the early Flatt, because that section corresponds so well to the part of the 1794 MS under discussion, entitled “Use on certain conditions where Phantasie plays a part”.  What is being used here is empirical psychology and the goal of this application is to show that these supposedly exalted, paranormal conditions may be explained scientifically and reasonably, as pathologies. This becomes evident when we understand where Flatt found the material for this discrete section. Curiously, this is the one section of the MS where Hoffmeister, in his exhaustive analysis of its diverse references, renounces finding a source.  
	In fact, a clue to discovering Flatt’s source for this section can be found, although someone circuitously, in a case of Seelenkrankheit referred to in the addition to PSS § 406.​[35]​  In the Zusatz, Hegel mentions a case of a soldier who deserted his post and hurried to his mother in a town some distance away, because he had the clear premonition that she was “being tied up by robbers”. Although this case attained some notoriety in late 18th Century Prussia, probably because the soldier was only lightly punished,​[36]​  I found the original account in C. P. Moritz’s Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde, a popular review published in Berlin between 1783 and 1793.  While the Magazin may possibly claim the title of first journal of psychiatry, it is certainly the first journal of anthropology, as Hegel understands that science in the PSS.​[37]​   An original Moritz footnote to this account (Desertion aus einem unbekannten Bewegungsgrunde) is highly revealing of the Magazin’s overall mission and its impact on Hegel’s PSS, through Flatt’s course material on the dreaming soul.  In his note, Moritz explains that such accounts of visions or clairvoyance are symptomatic of a “sick condition of the soul”, where it is allowed to express its natural qualities too strongly.  Although the Magazin regularly presents speculations on the nature of the soul and reflections on “speech from a psychological point of view”, most of the volumes are dedicated to recounting testimonials of dreams, nightmares, somnambulism, as well as what we might call parapsychological or even paranormal experiences.  Most significantly, the Magazin then brings these cases into the realm of scientific explanation, debunking them, one might say, by presenting them in terms of pathology, in order that we may reasonably know those aspects of the self that seem to lie beyond reason.​[38]​ The often colorful, highly subjective anecdotes and accounts are the stuff of empirical psychology or empirical anthropology, in the sense of the journal’s scientific concept of Erfahrungsseelenkunde.  The picturesque examples that nourish a number of the PSS’s Zuzätze are drawn from the Magazin and other similar sources. In spite of all the obvious qualities of Erdmann’s 1827 lecture notes, his philosophical decision to concentrate exclusively on Hegel’s conceptual discourse while leaving out the empirical psychology material is not without consequence.  We thus tend to forget the intellectual impetus that motivates these sources: the late Enlightenment’s struggle against supernatural religious fervor, enthrallment and fanaticism, taken together under the term Schärmerei.  In empirical psychology, in Flatt’s lecture and the 1794 MS, as well as in the mature PSS, this struggle is played out within the human psyche, in the constant power struggle between rational understanding and the dreaming soul, that defines sanity and madness.​[39]​
	Flatt’s 1789/90 lectures on empirical psychology were certainly inspired by the Magazin’s late Enlightenment mission of using “modern” anthropology to show that the excess of Phantasie, and particularly, the manifestations of Schwärmerei, are pathological conditions of the soul.  In this light, it should be no surprise that Mendelssohn served as an early advisor to the review.​[40]​  If indeed Hegel’s 1794 MS is inspired, through Flatt, by this aspect of the Enlightenment project, and if the MS informs the mature PSS, then it may also be useful in explaining the move from the dreaming soul to the feeling soul, which takes place in the mature PSS between the 1827 and 1830 editions.  My hypothesis is that Hegel espouses the Enlightenment dimension of the section on the sleeping and dreaming soul in his struggle against the Gefühlsreligion of his Berlin rival, the theologian Schleiermacher. In other words, the religion of feeling can now be seen as a type of Schwärmerei and thus as a pathological condition of the dreaming soul.  Reference to Schleiermacher’s religion of feeling in this section would explain the changing of the section’s title to “the feeling soul” and the attendant alterations to the section’s content. 
	Much has been written on the Hegel-Schleiermacher conflict at Berlin, and this is not the place to revisit it.​[41]​  In order to support the likelihood of my idea that Hegel makes the change from “dreaming” to “feeling” as a result of this conflict, it is necessary to show three things:  1) that Hegel associates Schleiermacher with expressions of feeling, 2) that Schleiermacher’s religion of feeling is referred to in the PSS section on the feeling soul, 3) that Hegel had a Schleiermacher-related reason to change the title of the section between 1827 and 1830.
	1) Although Hegel refers to Schleiermacher, or to his writings, in his early essays, the Difference Between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling (1801) and Faith and Knowing (1802), and briefly in the Philosophy of Right (1820), his main and most polemical treatment of his Berlin colleague and rival is found in the Preface Hegel wrote to H. F. W. Hinrichs’ Philosophy of Religion (1822).  Tracing the trajectory of these references, it may be argued that the evolution of Hegel’s attitude toward Schleiermacher follows the latter’s own progression from a religion of intuition, an expression he uses in the first edition of the Speeches on Religion, to a religion of feeling, a term he introduces in later editions of the Speeches and develops fully in his Dogmatics​[42]​ (1821) where the essence of religion is defined as the feeling of dependency toward God.  In parallel, Hegel moves from a position of Schelling-influenced intellectual intuition, not entirely dissimilar to Schleiermacher’s early idea of religion as an intuition of the universe, to a mature position where intuition tends to be assimilated into feeling, which is thought of as subjective, arbitrary and, above all, thoroughly natural.  The progression of Hegel’s own thought in this area consequently allows him to caricature Schleiermacher’s mature thought as revealing what it has been from its very origins, a religion of natural, subjective feeling.  Thus, Hegel is able to famously write, in the Preface to Hinrichs’ Religion, “If, in man, religion is based entirely on feeling […] the dog would then be the best Christian, for the dog […] lives mainly within feeling”, and further on, “[a] dog also has feelings of redemption when its hunger is satisfied by a bone.”​[43]​  The central argument of the Preface consists in a genealogical demonstration that presents Schleiermacher’s religion of feeling as symptomatic of a contemporary malaise, where modern cultures of empiricism and skepticism have fostered the belief that feeling is the only way to experience the truth. 
	2) How does religion and more specifically, the religion of feeling appear as a form of mental pathology, in the dreaming/feeling soul section of the PSS?  As mentioned above, the final part of the dreaming soul section of the 1794 MS deals with religious fervor and enthusiasm, a fact that is perfectly coherent with the pro-Enlightenment aspect of the MS’s source.  As the MS already puts it, the “religious pretension” of having access to “supernatural sources of knowledge” (übernaturalische Erkenntnisquellen) is, in fact, a form of “natural and transcendent ignorance.”  There is no mention of religious feeling in the MS because what will later be described as Gefühl and its pretension to immediate, absolute knowledge of the divine is, in 1794, still assigned to the delusional representations of Phantasie.  Nonetheless, early religious fantasy shares with the later expression of Gefühl the character of naturalness, regarding both origin and pathological morbidity.  Thus, in the MS, the cause of the Schwärmerei condition is either an “irritability of the organs” or an “over-stimulation of the imagination”, and, in its worst excesses, morbid religious fanaticism actually leads to murder (lines 532 – 538 Hoffmeister).​[44]​  This natural aspect of Schwärmerei is clearly echoed in Hegel’s Preface to Hinrichs’ Religion, where the practitioner of the religion of feeling (i.e. Schleiermacher) is repeatedly described as “the natural man” who claims to know God “without knowing anything at all.”​[45]​
  	Feeling, takes on increased importance between the 1827 and the 1830 editions of the PSS, as reflected in the change of title at § 403.  In the 1827 PSS, Hegel does not make the distinction between sentience (Empfindung) and feeling (Gefühl).  As we find articulated in the Erdmann lecture notes, “There is no great distinction to be made between sentience and feeling”.​[46]​  However, in § 402 of the 1830 edition, Hegel does come to make this distinction, which then allows him to introduce the new feeling-related section headings in that same edition:  “the feeling soul” (§ 403), “the feeling soul in its immediacy” (§ 405, where he also substantially lengthens the Remark, on feeling)  and to replace the term “sentient” with “feeling” twice in § 407 (self-feeling).  In a lengthy and instructive note, Williams provides a commentary on Hegel’s later distinction between Empfindung and Gefühl.​[47]​  
	Williams remarks that Hegel regards Gefühl as more active than the other concept. Hence, Williams associates Selbstgefühl with the first inchoate articulations of self-consciousness or “self-awareness”​[48]​, thereby down-playing the essential natural, animal aspect of the concept.  It should be mentioned, however, that the main distinction that Hegel makes between the terms is one of origin, with Empfindung referring to external sense-derived sentience and Gefühl relating to inner-derived feelings.​[49]​ As we see in the Preface to Hinrichs’ Religion, feeling, like sentience, remains natural.  In the 1830 PSS, this natural quality of interior feeling is assured by its intimate bond to Leiblichkeit (bodilyness).​[50]​  As well, while self-feeling may mark the first instance of self-distinguishing necessary for subsequent differentiation in consciousness, Hegel presents it as an immediate, “magical” division or judgment (Urteilen, as original dividing), which is inherently unstable in its lack of syllogistic mediation.  This is why self-feeling is open to derangement, alienation and madness.​[51]​
	References to religion in the 1827 Erdmann lecture notes on the dreaming soul section of the PSS deal with Schwärmerei in the form of enthrallment and fanaticism.  In these notes, Hegel refers to the surprising fact, gleaned from Pinel’s Parisian experiences, that one fourth to one fifth of all those in mental asylums suffer from religious delusions.​[52]​   These references in Erdmann’s notes are found in the paragraphs immediately preceding the discussion of “Habit” (PSS § 409) and thus correspond perfectly to the position of the subsection on Schwärmerei in the last part of the dreaming soul section of the 1794 MS.  As well, Walter’s notes from the 1827 lectures actually echo the MS’s reference to religious fanaticism and murder.​[53]​  However, it is important to see that by 1827, Hegel apparently considers the Phantasievorstellungen of religious fanaticism as either marginal or largely a thing of the past. They are not mentioned in the body of the Encyclopedia text and are only alluded to briefly in the accompanying lectures.  In this sense, Griesheim’s notes (1825) refer to it being “no longer the case” that “a lot of people” suffer from mental derangement through “religious representations (Vorstellungen)”.  This does not mean, however, that religious delusion has disappeared. It has merely changed form. The pathologies of religious fervor, of Schärmerei, originally discussed in the 1794 MS as conditions of the dreaming soul, are now present in the contemporary culture of feeling, whose perfect expression is found in Schleiermacher’s Gefühlsreligion.​[54]​  “Life in feeling”, writes Hegel in § 406 of the 1830 edition, “as a form or state of the self-conscious, cultivated man, is a sickness where the individual relates immediately to his own concrete content”. This is a form of folly or derangement because the “feeling individual” as “simple ideality” (§ 403), is, in fact, feeling his own particularity.  He thinks he has an intuition of the universe, when he is actually only feeling himself; he is thus symptomatic of “the perversion, the particular arrogance and absolute egoism that have surfaced in our time.”​[55]​  
	Above all, Schleiermacher’s religion of feeling is an affront to reason and science. It betrays “an animal ignorance (tierische Unwissenheit)”, as Hegel writes in the Preface to Hinrichs Religion.​[56]​  The fact that precisely the same term (Unwissenheit) is found in the 1794 MS, with reference to Schärmerei, at the end of the section on the dreaming soul​[57]​ not only reveals the late Enlightenment source of Hegel’s critique, it is also an indication that Schleiermacher’s religion of feeling should be understood as a privileged manifestation of the mental pathology Hegel comes to call feeling.  
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